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TEAM AND PROJECT COMPOSITION 
IN BIG PHYSICS EXPERIMENTS
ABSTRACT
Identifying optimal ways of organizing exploration in particle physics 
mega-labs is a challenging task that requires a combination of case-based 
and formal epistemic approaches. Data-driven studies suggest that 
projects pursued by smaller master-teams (fewer members, fewer sub-
teams) are substantially more efficient than larger ones across sciences, 
including experimental particle physics. Smaller teams also seem to make 
better project choices than larger, centralized teams. Yet the epistemic 
requirement of small, decentralized, and diverse teams contradicts the 
often emphasized and allegedly inescapable logic of discovery that forces 
physicists pursuing the fundamental levels of the physical world to 
perform centralized experiments in mega-labs at high energies. We 
explain, however, that this epistemic requirement could be met, since 
the nature of theoretical and physical constraints in high energy physics 
and the technological obstacles stemming from them turn out to be 
surprisingly open-ended.
1. Organizing Experimental Science: Epistemological Approaches
What are the best ways to organize big scientific communities and big scientif-
ic networks, big physics experiments, in particular?1 The organizational issues 
common to modern large physics laboratories were not common in a typical 
physics laboratory the size of a house basement at the beginning of the 20th 
century. There was, of course, a network of different laboratories that com-
municated, so organizational issues appeared at a higher level of organization. 
Today, however, there are a hundred times more professional physicists than 
before WWII (Kragh 2002, Ch 2). This is a staggering increase, much larger 
than the increase in the overall population of the respective societies. In addi-
tion, vastly more resources are invested in physics experiments today than in 
1  This work was presented at the 4th LOGiCIC international workshop at the Univer-
sity of Amsterdam, November 26–28, 2015. (https://logicicworkshop2015.wordpress.
com/programme/) It was also presented at an international conference How to Act 
 Together: From Collective Engagement to Protest held in Belgrade in November 19–21, 
2015, under the title “Epistemic and Social Networks in Big Science”.
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the age of small laboratories (Ibid.). The latest result of these trends is the Large 
Hadron Collider at CERN, which houses about ten thousand professionals, in-
cluding thousands of physicists. Discovery papers coming out the laboratory 
are sometimes signed by thousands of collaborators. Several obvious questions 
emerge. How should communities of this sort be organized? Has this kind of 
organization been implemented anywhere? And can large laboratories be or-
ganized into networks in optimal ways? 
There is often a political element to such questions, especially when fund-
ing agencies enter the picture. Is organizing science best left to scientists? Or 
should funding agencies be the ones to determine organization? The default 
response among academics seems to be to let scientists do their work because 
that is how they will perform best. To ensure results are advantageous to soci-
ety, the argument goes, funding agencies should not interfere substantially with 
the way scientists want to plan and perform their research. Yet this is a vacuous 
answer. To respond properly, we need to know what happens once the agencies 
grant the money to scientists and let them organize the way they do science. 
In fact, all sorts of outcomes can and do happen. Institutional inertia fre-
quently shapes long-running research (Torrisi 2014), or the funding structure 
can influence decisions and determine the organizational structure of research 
(Hallonsten and Heinze 2012). Both can be harmful to productivity and to the 
efficiency of research. The politics at all levels inevitably shape large research 
operations, often adversely (Chompalov et al. 2002; Greenberg 1999). One ex-
ample is the organization of CERN; during the first 15 years of its existence, 
it consistently performed worse than labs in the US. One of the main reasons 
was that at CERN, the quota of representatives of each donor nation was man-
dated. This prevented hiring based on merit alone. A strong top-down hierar-
chical organization was required to oversee the process (Herman et al. 1987).
Thus, while we agree that the science is best left to the scientists, we argue 
that this is only true if they approach the organizational issues as meticulously 
as they approach the subject of their research. But is there an optimal way of 
organizing teams and projects in large laboratories, i.e. an optimal organiza-
tion that provides optimal epistemic conditions for generating experimental 
knowledge? If so, can we identify it, and how? 
Diagram 1: Epistemological approaches to the organizational structure of scientific networks.
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We can approach the question in two different ways (Diagram 1). The first 
approach is formal and makes use of mathematical modeling and computer 
simulations. Philosophers, science policy analysts, computer scientists and oth-
ers have used this approach to address similar questions. For example, com-
puter simulations utilizing graphs have been used to examine how networks of 
various structures – centralized, loosely connected, or decentralized – affect 
efficiency and accuracy in performing certain kinds of tasks (Zollman 2007). 
Modelling techniques typically used in economics, utilizing, for instance, de-
cision theory, have been used for the same purpose (Charn et al. 1978). The 
second approach employs case-based analysis: a historical or data-driven anal-
ysis of particular cases can be performed to examine the networks in question 
(Perović et al 2016; Maruyama et al. 2015; Cetina 1999). 
There are strengths and weaknesses to both approaches, so ideally we should 
do comparative analysis as well. On the one hand, when relying on case-based 
analysis, we rarely arrive at succinct or formalizable conclusions. Thus, we 
can combine those sorts of insights with modelling and simulations to im-
prove understanding. On the other hand, the parameters in simulations and 
abstract formal models are usually not connected in obvious ways with actu-
al cases, so case-based studies can help establish this relationship in a direct 
and informed manner.
2. Efficiency and Structure of Scientific Networks
There are two sets of questions that these two approaches can address in our 
discussion of organizing science: quantitative and qualitative. First, what is the 
optimal team composition in terms of the number of researchers? How many 
members does an efficient research group require, and what is the optimal 
number of researchers in the laboratory, given a certain task? Second, in terms 
of the optimal project composition, what is an optimal division of researchers 
into groups (sub-teams)? Project leaders and managers have to grapple with 
these quantitative and qualitative questions and solve them under time con-
straints while having only a vague idea of how the actual research will unfold. 
If there are too few researchers per team, it is easy to end up with like-minded 
approaches to the problem, and the required diversity is lost. If there are too 
many, communication may not be effective. There is also a problem of inertia 
that sets in if the team has been working together for too long; this is a major 
issue in long-lasting experiments. 
These questions have been studied extensively by science policy scholars 
(Cook et al. 2015; Carillo et al. 2013; Maruyama et al. 2015; Torrisi et al. 2014), 
as they are of a general epistemological interest as much as they are a matter 
of practical concern. A recent example is a public debate among biologists on 
the optimal number of team members in a typical biology laboratory (Cook 
et al. 2015). In fact, these issues come up in other kinds of organizations, es-
pecially in industry where they were studied systematically in various ways 
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much earlier than in science. The answers are naturally context-specific, al-
though we may find an organizing rule or two that is epistemically beneficial 
across contexts. 
The question about the size of scientific networks and their ability to solve 
problems or make accurate predictions about natural phenomena is close-
ly related to the question of the role of cognitive diversity in groups. Indus-
tries are interested in exploring diversity as a way to increase the efficiency of 
their operations. Scott Page (2007) says: “Diversity matters because it can in-
crease the bottom line by introducing more perspectives, heuristics, interpre-
tations, and predictive models. Diverse cognitive tools can, in turn, improve 
an organization’s ability to solve problems and make accurate predictions.” He 
has developed a theorem (Page 2011) to capture the idea that a group will be 
better off if a new member is somehow different than the existing members, 
while the value of the contribution of each new member of the same type will 
keep diminishing with each addition. The theorem is applicable under the as-
sumption of the law of diminishing returns, a standard assumption in Utility 
Theory and in the assumption of the absence of interactions (interactions can 
be destructive). This abstract theorem is meant to be a baseline – and to pro-
vide motivation, as it were – for studying the impact of diversity across vari-
ous contexts and as a general argument for the benefit of cognitive diversity. 
3. Big Physics and Epistemic Norms
In our case, the question is how to optimally organize a large laboratory when 
attempting to discover a fundamental particle. How many researchers should 
work on a project and how should they be divided? How many laboratories 
will most efficiently result in discovery? Can a demanding discovery be made 
with only one laboratory? 
A recent quantitative study addressed the effect of team composition on ef-
ficiency in one of the major particle physics mega-laboratories, Fermi National 
Laboratory (Fermilab) (Perović et al. 2016). Efficiency was measured by deter-
mining the weighted citation counts in 12 categories. Using citation counts in 
this case was an accurate measure of the significance and fruitfulness of exper-
iments because the usual troubles of bibliometric analysis were absent. First, 
the field is very isolated, so only the experts working in the field read and cite 
(or fail to cite) the papers. The citations do not come from outside the group. 
Furthermore papers producing the same results will not be overlooked because 
only a handful of labs do research on the subject; thus, physicists cannot fail to 
take them into account. In short, the bibliometric data pretty much reflect peer 
agreement on the adequacy of experiments and the importance of their results. 
To analyze the data, the study used data envelopment analysis, a stan-
dard way of assessing efficiency of units in an organization (e.g. bank branch-
es) (Cooper et al. 2011). The method identifies efficient and inefficient units 
based on the same inputs and outputs. In this case, inputs were the number 
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of researchers and research teams for each experiment (a unit), and the out-
put was the above-characterized citation counts. It turned out that all efficient 
experiments were comparatively small, and all inefficient experiments were 
comparatively large.
A preliminary conclusion of this study and the conclusion of similar studies 
across various fields of science (Bonaccorsi and Daraio 2005; van der Val et al. 
2009; Campion et al. 1993) is that it is generally better to organize a number 
of small experiments and smaller teams. Moreover, at least in the cases similar 
to the ones studied, scientists should introduce diversity at some level, pref-
erably very early on, when teams pick the hypotheses they will test and when 
they design the experiments. Small groups avoid hierarchical and atmospher-
ic issues, as flat structures tend to be less hierarchical and provide more direct 
communication (Ibid.). 
Do such studies have a normative value? In other words, the conclusions 
of the analyses may be sound but it may be impossible to change much in or-
ganizational terms, so they may only offer insight into the limitations of real 
scientific networks. The logic of discovery in high energy physics, for instance, 
pushes us to build large laboratories. The discovery of fundamental particles 
requires collisions at high energies, and this, so the argument goes, requires 
large experimental machines. Eventually, “in science, as in war, big science 
becomes unavoidable” (Rescher 1999). 
In fact, there is no indication of sharp limits as experimental approaches 
to desired phenomena in fundamental physics do not have very specific, but 
rather general requirements to start with. We can test the Standard Model in 
a number of ways that do not require high energies achieved by large colliders 
and in much smaller laboratories. 
The background physical theories (Quantum Field Theory and Quantum 
Electrodynamics) define possible physical phenomena within a very wide range 
of energies and processes. The general constraints are then defined at the level 
of Model Theories (in agreement with the background theories; e.g. the Stan-
dard Model or Super Symmetry – SUSY) defining the “particle signatures” 
(i.e. kind decays desired particles ought to produce) to be detected. The actual 
physical constraints affecting actual experiments are shaped only at the level 
of phenomenological theories which tell us, for example, what sort of intensity 
of gamma radiation we may expect in a certain kind of detector for presumed 
particle decay. This is the level of theory at which the choice of the processes 
to detect happens. This is where energy domains are determined and particles 
of interest and the expected observable outcomes of the postulated processes 
are defined. And these offer a wide range of direct and indirect ways of reli-
able and substantial detection. 
In fact, detection of particles that decouple at high energies and their prop-
erties does not necessitate production of such high energies at all. Thus, we 
can observe cosmic rays that harbor high energy particles instead of producing 
them in accelerators. Detection of this sort is an unstable process and the pa-
rameters cannot be controlled the way they can in particle colliders. This led 
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to its early sidelining in the development of High Energy Physics. Yet recent 
developments, due to a staggering increase in computing power, mean that the 
symbiosis of simulations and observation, enabled by new detecting techniques, 
has become a potent tool – perhaps as potent as controlled experimentation. 
Similarly, astrophysics of high energy events can provide insights that even 
colliders cannot, as transient events at much larger energies in observational 
astrophysics are inaccessible to accelerators. Moreover, in the so called neu-
tron guides, “testing basic principles of physics does not necessarily require a 
high-energy accelerator” (Geltenbort 2013). Neutrons are susceptible to all four 
basic physical forces. As they are electrically neutral, they cannot be guided 
and bunched by electric currents as protons in hadron colliders. But in 1959, 
Y. B. Zel’dovich realized that if they are super-cooled, neutrons can be slowed 
down (to 2m/s) and bunched. A phenomenological theory explains how this 
can be achieved. A neutron in a gravitational field can be used to test for the 
existence of the fifth force, the existence of which both the Standard Model 
and Super Symmetry theory predict. The decay time of neutrons is also rele-
vant, as decay is based on weak force. Finally, neutrons are composed of u and 
d quarks with opposing fractional charges. If the charges do not exactly coin-
cide, the neutron is characterized by such an Electric Dipole Moment which 
would imply the violation of Charge Parity and Time reversal symmetries. The 
shortcoming of the Standard Model is that the violation of Charge Parity in 
weak force is insufficient to explain the dominance of matter to anti-matter. 
The alternatives to the Standard Model propose a small Electric Dipole Mo-
ment. These alternatives can all be tested in neutron guides.
Alternatively, we could employ a very different strategy and improve the 
situation by creating favourable epistemological conditions at an early stage 
of experimentation. For example, instead of investing a large sum in a collider 
with the current technology, we could conceivably invest in pioneering devel-
opments of technologies that will eventually decrease the price of experiment-
ing at desirable energies. If we opt for a portfolio strategy of diverse investing 
across laboratories, our innovating in experimentation across energies may 
bear fruit. In fact, an example of the potential for this strategy to work in ex-
perimental particle physics is the development of the detecting techniques 
and accelerating tools (magnets and superconductors, above all) for linear 
colliders. These colliders provide a much clearer picture of particle interac-
tions than circular ones, since they can collide leptons – particles that are not 
composed of more elementary parts (quarks) and, thus, do not produce a large 
number of background interactions – at the requisite high energies. When the 
decision was made to build LHC at CERN, technology for linear collisions 
at sufficiently high energies for testing the Higgs boson hypothesis was not 
available, but building a giant circular hadron collider was an achievable goal 
(Panoffsky 1994). In the meantime, even with a comparatively small invest-
ment, the length of the linear collider performing at sufficiently high energies 
was reduced by 50%, and the detecting problems these colliders initially faced 
were solved by investing in techniques at much lower energies (related to the 
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magnets, criogenics, and detecting techniques).2 But the granted lump sum (of 
about ten billion dollars) was already spent on building the LHC, so the linear 
collider that would provide much more precise insights into relevant particle 
interactions could not be built. 
How far would physics have advanced if the money had been spent on the 
development of diverse technologies for linear collisions? There are, of course, 
political and funding reasons why physicists need to invest in technology that 
will produce results within a set time span with high certainty. But that only 
means funding agencies are enforcing a less efficient strategy of organizing ex-
perimentation, not that there are clear technological and physical limits push-
ing physics to develop against the epistemologically beneficial norms. Institu-
tional inertia and the traditional way of organizing established during WWII 
and the Manhattan project may go against these norms as well. 
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Struktura timova i projekata u velikim eksperimentima u oblasti fizike 
Apstrakt 
Identifikovanje optimalnih načina organizovanja istraživanja u mega laboratorijama fizike če-
stica je izazovan zadatak koji zahteva kombinaciju studija pojedinačnih slučajeva i pristupa 
formalne epistemičke analize. Studije zasnovane na podacima ukazuju na to da su projekti 
koje izvode manji master timovi (manji broj članova, manje pod-timova) znatno efikasniji od 
onih većih u različitim oblastima nauka, uključujući eksperimentalnu fiziku čestica. Manji ti-
movi takođe prave bolje izbore projekata na kojima će raditi od većih, centralizovanih timova. 
Pa ipak, epistemički opravdani zahtev sa što manjim, decentralizovanim i raznolikim timova 
je u suprotnosti sa često naglašenom i navodno neizbežnom logikom otkrića koja prisiljava 
fizičare koji istražuju osnovne nivoe fizičkog sveta da izvode centralizovane eksperimente u 
mega-laboratorijama na veoma velikim energijama. Naš je argument, međutim, da bi taj epi-
stemički zahtev mogao ipak biti ispunjen, jer su priroda teorijskih i fizičkih ograničenja u fizici 
visokih energija i tehnološke prepreke koje iz njih proizilaze iznenađujuće otvoreni.
Ključne reči: socijalna epistemologija, mreže, nauka, fizika, tehnologija, inovacija
